Work in Progress

Incentive Compatibility and Non-Equilibrium Mechanism Design

Draft available upon request

The Bayesian implementation literature has identified in Bayesian Incentive Compatibility (BIC) a key condition that a social choice rule has to satisfy to be fully implementable by a social planner. I propose a generalized model of implementation that does not assume rational expectations, and I characterize the class of solution concepts such that BIC is necessary for full implementation of functions. I find we can not expect significantly more permissive results by dropping the rational expectations assumption and moving to non-equilibrium models. Using the same conditions, I also prove that some classical results in the literature hold for a wide range of non-equilibrium solution concepts, even in the case of the full implementation of social choice sets.

Paper presentations: Brown University Theory and Experimental Lunch (2021, 2022), Boston College Graduate Reading Group, 12th Conference on Economic Design, 16th SSCW Meeting, University of Bologna (Internal Seminar, 2022), SING17, 33rd Stony Brook International Conference.

Recommendations and Non-Equilibrium Mechanism Design